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CONTINUITY AND THE LEGISLATIVE DESIGN
John F Manning*
INTRODUCTION
More than half a century ago, Karl Llewellyn famously argued
that the canons of construction are indeterminate and that judges in-
voke them to justify decisions in fact made on other grounds.' Llewel-
lyn's critique had a devastating impact, in part, because he supported
his claim by aligning twenty-eight "Thrusts" against twenty-eight "Par-
ries."2 Because each canon thus seemed to have an equally potent
counterpart, Llewellyn deemed it a "foolish pretense" for courts to
attempt to apply "a set of mutually contradictory correct rules on How
to Construe Statutes.
'3
Although a number of important scholars still accept Llewellyn's
insight,4 academic opinion across a rather wide spectrum now seems
to view Llewellyn's critique as overdone. Essential to this shift is the
recognition that the canons could not, and do not purport to, pro-
duce mechanical answers to interpretive questions. Thus, proponents
now emphasize that much like any other interpretive practice, a ca-
non's utility will depend on the interpreter's capacity, at times, to
identify how members of a linguistic community would ordinarily use
that canon in context.5 Moreover, even if Llewellyn was correct to say
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Bradford Clark,
William Kelley, Lance Liebman, Debra Livingston, Henry Monaghan, and John Nagle
for insightful comments on a prior draft.
I See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VANO. L. REv. 395, 399 (1950). As Cass
Sunstein accurately wrote nearly four decades later, "[a]lmost no one has had a
favorable word to say about the canons in many years." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. Ruv. 405, 452 (1989).
2 Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 401-06.
3 Id. at 399.
4 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VANo. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 805-14
(1983).
5 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 647, 651 (1992):
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that many of the traditional canons contradicted one another, impor-
tant recent scholarship has suggested that courts (or, indeed, legisla-
tures) could rationalize the system to permit more predictable
application.
6
The renewed ideal of a meaningful system of canons ties into im-
portant strategic goals of competing schools of thought about statu-
tory interpretation. Because modern formalists (qua textualists)
doubt that intent or purpose gleaned from the legislative history of-
fers a reliable way to resolve statutory indefiniteness, 7 they want clear
and predictable background rules to help legislators and interpreters
W] hile it is true that no meta-rule or formal model is available to instruct
judges in picking and choosing among canons, in the same way that people
who do not know the rules of grammar can employ grammatically correct
language when speaking English, it seems plausible that judges can select
among canons in a sensible and coherent fashion even in the absence of
known rules to guide them.
Id.
6 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip N. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilib-
rium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994) (contending that "the Supreme Court is itself
aware of [Llewellyn's basic] criticism and can therefore be expected to counteract its
force"); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv.
L. REv. 2085, 2148-49 (2002) (arguing that Congress could adopt a code of statutory
interpretation and "ameliorate the problem of conflicting canons by enacting priority
rules"); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 461 (arguing that judges should endeavor affirma-
tively "to identify norms on which participants in the legal culture might agree ...
and to generate principles under which conflicting norms might be reconciled"). In
several recent cases, the Court has begun to develop sub-rules to clarify when certain
canons of construction apply. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149,
168 (2003) ("[T]he canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every
statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members
of an 'associated group or series,' justifying the inference that items not mentioned
were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.") (quoting United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)); Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002)
("The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that
should be understood to go hand in hand, which is abridged in circumstances sup-
porting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be ex-
cluded."); Landgraff v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244, 263-80 (1994)
(concluding that the constitutionally-inspired maxim disfavoring retroactive liability
takes priority over the more conventional maxim that a federal court should apply the
law in effect at the time it renders its decision).
7 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 684-89 (1997) (describing the textualist position); see also Frank H. Easter-
brook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983) (using the insights of
public choice theory to explain the indeterminacy of actual legislative intent); Ken-
neth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992) (same).
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decode textual cues.8 Modern pragmatists share the formalists'
doubts about intent and purpose as organizing principles but have
less faith in the statutory text.9 Given the inevitability of (some)
meaningful statutory indeterminacy, they want judges to devise rules
of construction that will produce socially and institutionally beneficial
outcomes. 10
In a characteristically thoughtful article entitled Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation, David Shapiro has joined issue by of-
fering a measured analysis that does not align him obviously with ei-
ther major camp." Starting from the (previously discussed)
assumption that the canons are (or can be) intelligible in context,
Professor Shapiro attributes a unifying theme to a broad array of fa-
miliar and frequently used canons. 12 In particular, he notes that some
8 Modem textualists accept Wittgenstein's premise that words lack intrinsic
meaning and that effective communication depends on a community's shared linguis-
tic practices and understandings. See Cont'l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d
1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ('You don't have to be Ludwig Wittgen-
stein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on
meanings shared by interpretive communities."); see also LUDWIG WI-rGENSTEIN, PHIL-
OSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 134-142 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1953) (em-
phasizing the use of words in linguistic interactions within the relevant community).
As Jeremy Waldron thus explains, effective legislation necessarily "depends on lan-
guage, on the shared conventions that constitute a language, and on the reciprocity
of intentions that conventions comprise." Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and
Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
329, 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAw AND INTERPRETATION].
9 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325-45 (1990) (arguing that all three foun-
dational philosophies suffer defects in legitimacy and determinacy); Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 416-37 (considering the limits of the traditional philosophies).
10 For example, Professor Sunstein believes that to make up for deficiencies in
the traditional methods, judges should develop maxims of construction that serve the
same function as contract default rules-" 'off-the-rack' provisions" that enable judges
to address ambiguity or absurdity when conventional methods come up short. See
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 453-54.
11 David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921 (1992).
12 Professor Shapiro does not, of course, contend that every traditional canon of
construction has a pro-continuity bias. A number of the canons identified by Llewel-
lyn-mainly those described as "Parries"-suggest the possibility of broad judicial
construction. For example, Llewellyn's first "Parry" provides that "[lo effectuate its
purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." Llewellyn, supra note 1, at
401. In a similar vein, the very next one states that "[s]uch acts will be liberally con-
strued if their nature is remedial." Id. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to examine
whether and to what extent the more dynamic canons can co-exist with the pro-con-
tinuity canons that serve as Professor Shapiro's focus. Nor do I consider whether the
body of traditional canons, taken as a whole, have a pro- or anti-continuity bias. For
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of the most salient linguistic canons (such as expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius) and substantive canons (such as the rule of lenity) per-
form a cautionary function; they direct interpreters to favor continuity
rather than change in cases of doubt.
This tendency, Professor Shapiro adds, produces a number of de-
sirable institutional and substantive effects: If "change is news but con-
tinuity is not," then a legislature wishing to change the status quo
would presumably feel it necessary to be explicit about "what is being
changed."1 3 If so, continuity canons may offer a more accurate sense
of legislative purpose. Such canons, moreover, often serve important
process values. For instance, by disfavoring inexplicit changes in the
legal baseline, canons like the rule of lenity serve interests in notice
derived from the Due Process Clause. 14 More generally, cautionary
canons promote legislative accountability by requiring the legislature
to show that it has "faced the problem and decided that change is
appropriate." 15 A growing number of (concededly idiosyncratic) sub-
stantive canons, moreover, intensify that requirement by requiring
particularly clear policy expression when a statute otherwise threatens
to intrude upon constitutional values such as federalism or the separa-
tion of powers.
1 6
Professor Shapiro's praise of continuity has an oddly countercul-
tural ring to it. As he notes, some of the canons' most forceful critics
have long maintained that the traditional maxims of close construc-
tion-the ones that he favors-constrict legislative authority, stifle ju-
dicial creativity, and straightjacket the law's adaptability.17 More than
a century-and-a-half ago, Francis Lieber lamented that canons requir-
ing the narrow construction of British statutes had compelled Parlia-
ment to enact pathologically detailed legislation; only then could
legislators overcome an apparent judicial antipathy to legislative inno-
vation. 18 Frederick Pollock similarly complained that many rules of
purposes of evaluating Professor Shapiro's contribution to the debate, it suffices to
note that he has identified a definite pro-continuity bias in a number of significant
and frequently invoked canons and that he has taken the unusual step (in modern
interpretation scholarship) of defending that tendency.
13 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 942.
14 See id. at 943.
15 Id. at 944.
16 See id. at 945-46.
17 Id. at 949-50.
18 As Lieber wrote:
The British spirit of civil liberty, induced the English judges to adhere strictly
to the law, to its exact expressions. This again induced the law-makers to be,
in their phraseology, as explicit and minute as possible, which causes such a
tautology and endless repetition in the statutes of that country, that even so
1866 [VOL- 79:5
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construction "cannot well be accounted for except on the theory that
Parliament generally changes the law for the worse, and that the busi-
ness of the judges is to keep the mischief of its interference within the
narrowest possible bounds."'19 To this day, such concerns about the
canons' anti-legislation bias abound in statutory interpretation schol-
arship.20 Indeed, as I discuss below, a number of the most prominent
anti-formalist theories of statutory interpretation rest, at least in part,
on the premise that rules of construction should foster the inter-
preter's power to adapt statutory texts to problems that the legislature
did not foresee, whether or not those problems come within the pur-
view of the statute's conventional or expected meaning. 21
A brief essay does not permit full consideration of the many com-
plex questions raised by Professor Shapiro's thoughtful article. Ac-
cordingly, I will focus my attention on the essence of what divides his
writing from more typical statutory interpretation scholarship-the
desirability vel non of putting a thumb on the scale of continuity
rather than change in the interpretation of statutes. I will examine
this question, moreover, in the circumscribed but important context
of federal legislation. Perhaps because Professor Shapiro's article ex-
amines interpretation in general rather than federal statutes, his analy-
eminent a statesman as Sir Robert Peel, declared in parliament, that he
"contemplates no task with so much distaste, as the reading through an ordi-
nary act of parliament." Men have at length found out, that little or nothing
is gained by attempting to speak with absolute clearness, and endless specifi-
cations, but that human speech is clearer, the less we endeavor to supply by
words and specifications, that interpretation which common sense must give
to human words.
FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETA-
TION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS, WITH REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS AND
AUTHORITIEs 30 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839).
19 FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 85 (London, MacMil-
lan 1882).
20 See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 41-42 (1982) ("Espe-
cially in older decisions one senses that sometimes judges . . .invoked such rules of
construction because they regarded the growth of statute law as an intrusion on their
importance and their superior professional skill in building policy."); Stephen F. Ross,
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You ?, 45
VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 (1992) (arguing "that canons have actually been abused as
part of the judiciary's systematic attempt to frustrate legislative policy preferences");
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 408 (noting that canons such as the one requiring narrow
construction of statutes in derogation of the common law historically "treated regula-
tory statutes as foreign substances"); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common
Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 911 (1982) (ar-
guing that "doctrines like expressio unius ... result in limits on the reach of regula-
tory legislation into the marketplace and into private contract rights").
21 See infra text accompanying notes 56-64.
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sis does not specifically consider whether the legislative process
prescribed by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has anything dis-
tinctive to say about interpretive preferences for continuity or
change.22 As I have argued in earlier writing, I believe that the design
of interpretive rules should attempt to further rather than detract
from the goals implicit in the constitutional structure. 23 Starting from
that assumption here, I will suggest that the structural values associ-
ated with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article
I, Section 7 dovetail nicely with Professor Shapiro's insight about the
canons. To enact a statute, lawmakers must overcome tremendous in-
ertia by securing the assent of three institutions that answer to differ-
ent constituencies. This design feature, moreover, places a clear
emphasis on caution, consensus, and deliberation. Although suffi-
ciently manifest in the design itself, the resulting pro-continuity bias
also finds support in many writings contemporaneous with the Consti-
tution's adoption and in important judicial decisions rendered
since. 24 At least at the federal level, therefore, Shapiro's continuity
canons fit well with the background assumptions of the legislative
process.
Of course, that fact alone does not justify retention of the canons
Professor Shapiro admires. The validity of a particular rule of inter-
pretation cannot be measured by the fact that it promotes continuity
rather than change. That criterion is too general ever to be decisive
on its own. But the pro-continuity emphasis of the constitutional
structure may well undermine the central criticism of anti-legislative
bias that detractors direct at many traditional canons. By calling into
question that prominent argument against such interpretive norms,
Professor Shapiro's article casts critical light upon a frequently as-
sumed but often undefended pro-legislation bias in the statutory in-
terpretation debate.
Part I of this Essay starts by describing Professor Shapiro's conten-
tion that many of the most important canons of construction have a
normatively desirable bias in favor of the status quo. It then contrasts
that insight with the more dominant academic preference for rules of
construction that promote dynamic statutory interpretation. Part II
examines ways in which, at least at the federal level, the constitutional
22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
23 SeeJohn F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 636-37 (1996); John F. Manning,
Constitutional Stucture and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 685, 690-92 (1999).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 77-90.
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structure reinforces Professor Shapiro's normative preference for con-
tinuity rather than change.
I. PROFESSOR SHAPIRO'S INSIGHT
Professor Shapiro's central claim is that many of the most promi-
nent canons of construction reflect a unifying theme of favoring con-
tinuity rather than change (in cases of doubt) and that this tendency,
on balance, has positive effects. Indeed, because he detects a similar
bias in a range of linguistic and substantive canons, Professor Shapiro
is able to identify a rather diverse array of normative benefits-includ-
ing the promotion of legislative supremacy, the fostering of delibera-
tion, the provision of fair notice to litigants, and the protection of
specified constitutional values such as federalism. Although it is un-
necessary to retrace all of the careful steps in Professor Shapiro's anal-
ysis, a few brief examples will give the reader a sense of his important
contribution.
A. Continuity Canons
Professor Shapiro begins by noting that two important linguistic
canons-expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the specification of one
thing excludes others) and ejusdem generis (read a general phrase in
light of related specific items) -place a mild constraint on legislatively
induced change. It is worth emphasizing, at the outset, that Professor
Shapiro regards the linguistic canons as only a mild constraint because
he properly perceives them as aids to construction, not as mechanical
determinants of meaning. 25 Like any linguistic convention, canons
have meaning only to the extent that a linguistic community has de-
veloped shared (and often unarticulated) practices and understand-
ings about their effect in sufficiently repetitive contexts.2 6 For
25 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 928-29, 930-31.
26 SeeJohn F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2396-98
(2003) (discussing certain premises of modern language theory). Building on
Wittgenstein's insights, much language theory presupposes that communication is in-
telligible by virtue of a community's shared conventions for understanding words and
phrases in context. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 72 (1992) (not-
ing that "social practice" can lend determinacy to rule-following);Jules L. Coleman &
Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in LAw AND INTERPRETATION, supra
note 8, at 203, 222 ("Meaning is not radically indeterminate; instead, meaning is pub-
lic-fixed by public behaviour, beliefs, and understandings. There is no reason to
assume that such conventions cannot fix the meaning of terms determinately.");
Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of
Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 1010 (1994) (noting that under Wittgenstein's premises, "the
correctness of a particular use of a word . . . expresses the natural tendencies of a
2004] 1869
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example, as Shapiro notes, the expressio unius canon does not apply
simply because a statute specifies something; rather, its force depends
on whether a reasonable speaker would draw a negative implication
from reading the relevant text in context.27 Or as the Court recently
put it, "the canon .. .does not apply to every statutory listing or
grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of
an 'associated group or series,' justifying the inference that items not
mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.
28
Starting from that basic understanding of the linguistic canons,
Shapiro next contends that both the expressio unius and ejusdem
generis canons are apt to favor continuity rather than change.29 Al-
though ultimately an empirical question, 30 the intuition seems amply
community of users"). Of course, an important strain of critical legal scholarship has
suggested that a baseline problem of linguistic indeterminacy makes rule-following
impossible. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1984) (explaining that rules "generally do not determine
the scope of their own application"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:
A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 I-IARv. L. REV. 781, 822-23 (1983)
(contending that a direction "to follow the rules tells us nothing of substance" and
that the socialization of judges more accurately predicts judicial outcomes). Consid-
eration of this broader question is beyond the scope of this Essay.
27 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 928-29.
28 Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). As one commentator has put it, the canon
.properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the
reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is
omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference." EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 337 (1940) (quoting State ex rel. Curtis v. De Corps, 134
Ohio 295, 299 (Ohio 1938)).
29 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 927-31.
30 For example, the expressio unius canon will have varying effects on the status
quo, depending on the context in which it is applied. For instance, when a statute
establishes a new form of authority and takes pains to particularize the way it should
be exercised, the Court has traditionally treated the resulting specification as exclu-
sive. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) ("Since the Act creates a public cause of action for the enforcement
of its provisions and a private cause of action only under very limited circumstances,
this maxim would clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies created in
§ 307(a) are... exclusive ...."); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282,
289 (1929) ("When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes
the negative of any other mode."). In those circumstances, the expresso unius canon
doubtless constrains change. At the same time, when an instrument enumerates ex-
ceptions to a power or prohibition created elsewhere in the same document, the
Court typically treats the enumeration as exhaustive. See, e.g., United States v. Brock-
amp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) ("[The statute's] detail, its technical language, the
iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit
listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend
1870 (VOL- 79:5
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justifiable in the following respect. In slightly inconsistent ways, both
maxims tend to limit judicial capacities to read a statutory text expan-
sively. Expressio unius discourages judges from extending a statute
through common law reasoning to cases that fall within the ratio legis
but not the terms of a statute. Ejusdem generis, on the other hand,
directs judges to employ common law reasoning to limit an otherwise
open-ended catch-all phrase in light of the underlying logic of the
more specific items with which it is listed in a statute.
Consider the following example of the constraints that the ex-
pressio unius canon places on judicial authority. A provision of the
Civil Rights Act authorizes the prevailing plaintiff in specified classes
of cases to recover a "reasonable attorney's fee" as part of costs. 31 If
the plaintiff wished to recover expert fees as part of the "attorney's
fee," a court might initially find such a question debatable. After all,
an expert fee is not literally an attorney's fee. But the term "attorney's
fee," as used in the legal profession, might include not merely the
attorney's billable hours, but also many other items that are essential
to a representation-such as paralegal services, secretarial services,
messengers, photocopying, Westlaw charges, and so forth.3 2 Moreo-
ver, if one were to examine the apparent purposes of such a fee shift-
ing statute (to provide full recovery of litigation costs), it might well
appear arbitrary to shift the other costs of legal representation but not
the cost of experts needed to make the legal representation effec-
courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the stat-
ute [of limitations] .... "); Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)
("Where Congress explicitly enumerates exceptions to a general prohibition, addi-
tional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary
legislative intent."). Application of the canon to statutory exceptions may at times
intensify a change in the legal status quo.
Although he acknowledges the expressio unius canon's potential double-edged
effect, Professor Shapiro argues that applying it to statutory exemptions or provisos
also promotes continuity. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 928 n.33. In particular, he
contends that "an exemption or proviso also constitutes a change in the law-whether
it be the law resulting from a prior version of the statute or the law resulting from the
very statute being enacted." Id. I agree with Professor Shapiro's assessment, subject
to the following qualification: From the perspective of changes in private ordering,
applying the expressio unius maxim to a statutory exemption or proviso may at times
accentuate legislative alterations of the status quo. But if one views the matter from
the perspective of ajudge's authority to adapt a statutory text-whether an affirmative
provision or an exception-to unforeseen circumstances, then the expressio unius
canon generally does restrain legal change.
31 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
32 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-89 (1989) (holding that various
items other than billable attorney hours, including paralegal fees, could be recovered
as "traditional" elements of an attorney's fees).
2004]
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tive.33 Accordingly, as an initial cut, a court would surely have room
to award expert fees as part of an "attorney's fee." If, however, numer-
ous other fee-shifting statutes, enacted before and after the one in
question, had explicitly provided for "attorney's fees" and "expert
fees" as separate items of recovery, then the expressio unius principle
might require a different outcome. 34 Under that maxim, "'it is gener-
ally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion'" of particular statutory language.
3 5
Hence, judicial authority to read the Civil Rights Act's fee provision
broadly in light of its underlying purpose will tend to be circum-
scribed if a court is prepared to credit negative implications.
A brief illustration of the ejusdem generis maxim shows a similar
pro-continuity tendency-though one reached through quite differ-
ent means. This canon functions to qualify the scope of an general
provision in light of the specific ones with which it is associated.3 6 To
borrow one of Professor Shapiro's examples, if a statute excludes
"dogs, cats, or other animals" from a public park, the canon generally
would instruct courts not to bar police horses despite the breadth of
the residual clause.3 7 Why? As Professor Shapiro explains, the maxim
presupposes that "a better understanding of the statutory objective
may be gleaned from the specific examples" and that this overall "pur-
pose" properly confines the otherwise broad textual meaning of the
catch-all phrase.3 8 From that vantage point, the purpose of the no-
animals-in-the-park statute apparently was to bar common household
pets.
33 SeeW. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 107-08 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("To allow reimbursement of these other categories of expenses, and yet
not to include expert witness fees, is both arbitrary and contrary to the broad reme-
dial purpose that inspired the fee-shifting provision of § 1988.").
34 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Casey relied specifically on that dispar-
ity in denying the recovery of expert fees under Section 1988. See id. at 88-92.
35 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
36 The ejusdem generis maxim provides that "when a general term follows a spe-
cific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the
one with specific enumeration." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n,
499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991); see also, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18
(1946) ("Under the jusdem generis rule of construction the general words are con-
fined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it."); Gooch v. United States, 297
U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (noting that canon of ejusdem generis ordinarily "limits general
terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified").
37 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 930.
38 See id.
CONTINUITY AND LEGISLATIVE DESIGN
The contrast between the two maxims strongly illustrates Sha-
piro's continuity claim. In the attorney's fee case, an interpreter
might have taken the specification of "expert fees" in addition to "at-
torney's fees" in other statutes as evidence of a general congressional
policy to provide full recovery of litigation expenses. On that account,
it would have been possible to invoke that settled policy preference to
give a more expansive reading of the ambiguous phrase "attorney's
fee" in the Civil Rights Act. Instead, the expressio unius maxim high-
lighted the semantic distinction between that fee statute and others,
thereby imposing a constraint on judicial power. Conversely, in the
no-animals-in-the-park example, the semantic meaning of the catch-all
phrase would seem to reach police horses. Nonetheless, the ejusdem
generis maxim counsels against reading the prohibition "as broadly as
each word, taken in isolation, might suggest. '3 9 Each maxim thus as-
signs somewhat a different priority to statutory language and purpose,
but both display a common tendency to promote continuity and limit
change.
Professor Shapiro sees similar trends in many of the substantive
canons. The substantive canons he addresses require less discussion
because a pro-continuity bias is so evident in their design. The rule of
lenity, for example, instructs that "penal laws are to be construed
strictly. '40 Accordingly, the Court has made clear that a criminal stat-
ute does not apply unless it unambiguously reaches the charged con-
duct.4 1 In addition, the canon requiring narrow construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law explicitly directs courts to
resolve doubts against changes in the legal status quo.42 And in more
39 Id.
40 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.).
For Professor Shapiro's discussion of lenity, see Shapiro, supra note 11, at 935-36.
41 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (noting that the
rule of lenity requires that "ambiguous criminal statute [s] ... be construed in favor of
the accused"); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) ("In these circum-
stances-where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's po-
sition is unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity
in [the accused's] favor."); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (empha-
sizing that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity").
42 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 936-37; see also Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983) ("It is a well-established
principle of statutory construction that '[the common law . . . ought not to be
deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this pur-
pose.'") (quoting Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623
(1813)); Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959)
("'[N]o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words
import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law
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recent years, the Court has devised an array of "clear statement rules"
that favor the status quo by requiring a clear expression of legislative
intent before judges will construe a statute to intrude upon constitu-
tional values such as federalism or the separation of powers. 43 Al-
though the foregoing substantive canons vary in strictness, all of them
operate in the same basic way: They constrain change by insisting
upon unusual clarity of expression, which raises the cost of legislative
agreement upon policies that conflict with the identified substantive
goals.
B. Continuity as a Virtue
Professor Shapiro regards the canons' pro-continuity bias as valu-
able in several respects. In characteristic fashion, Professor Shapiro's
assessment of the canons is thoroughly undogmatic. Rather, in care-
fully measured analysis, he identifies some advantages, general and
specific, that flow from the overall tendency he perceives. Again,
rather than rehearse his analysis in full, I attempt here to give a flavor
of Professor Shapiro's insightful contribution.
First, he argues that by favoring the status quo, the canons-par-
ticularly the linguistic canons-have the virtue of capturing legislative
purpose.44 Building on a strain of modern language theory, 45 Shapiro
which it does not fairly express.'") (quoting Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565
(1879)). At times the Court has framed the presumption in milder terms. As the
Court recently put it, "where a common-law principle is well established, . . . the
courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." Asto-
ria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting lsbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
43 SeeShapiro, supra note 11, at 940-41; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
460 (1991) (requiring a clear statement of legislative intent to invade the fundamen-
tal state prerogatives through which "a State defines itself as a sovereign"); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its inten-
tion unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."). For thoughtful considera-
tion of this growing phenomenon, see, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking,
45 VANO. L. REv. 593, 596-98 (1992) (discussing recent Courts' uses of constitution-
ally-inspired clear statement rules); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of
Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Defer-
ence to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 551-65 (1998) (discussing clear statement
canons).
44 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 941-43.
45 Recent legal scholarship has systematically defended the canons in terms of the
insights of linguistic pragmatics-a branch of linguistics that purports to explain the
way people use language in conversational settings. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller,
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emphasizes that legislative drafters typically will not have "a casual or
even a wholly 'neutral' attitude towards change. '46 Rather, as he
explains:
[I]n a cooperative setting, a speaker wishing to use language effi-
ciently and effectively will communicate as much as is necessary for
purposes of the exchange, but no more. Thus, in a world in which
change is news but continuity is not, a speaker who is issuing an
order or prohibition is likely to focus on what is being changed and
to expect the listener to understand that, so far as this communica-
tion is concerned, all else remains the same.... [T]his theory of
communication suggests that a speaker is more likely to be correctly
understood if serious doubts are resolved against a change in ex-
isting rules or practices.
47
Hence, for example, a legislator voting for a statute requiring the vac-
cination of cats born after a certain date would presumably be sur-
prised to learn that a public health officer or judge had extended its
reach to cats born before the specified date or to dogs of any
vintage.
48
In other respects, Professor Shapiro argues that the pro-con-
tinuity canons serve both process and substantive values, often in-
spired if not required by the Constitution. The rule of lenity, for
example, protects the public's right to fair notice and even-handed
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179, 1224 (arguing that
"many traditional maxims of statutory interpretation embody legitimate valid infer-
ences of legislative intent"); M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics
in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373 (1985). In particular, Paul Grice
argues that conversations are typically cooperative and that the norms of communica-
tion should reflect that premise. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WoRDs 26
(1989). He has deduced several maxims to implement this "Cooperative Principle."
Id. These common sense norms of conversation include: "Make your conversation as
informative as is required" (quantity); "[t]ry to make your contribution one that is
true" (quality); "[b]e relevant" (relation); and "[alvoid obscurity of expression" (man-
ner). Id. at 27-28. Professors Miller and Sinclair have relied on Grice's insights to
explain a number of the canons. For example, they argue that the expressio unius
canon reflects the idea that speakers in a cooperative setting ordinarily try to make
their contribution as informative as necessary for purposes of the exchange. See
Miller, supra, at 1196-97; Sinclair, supra, at 415-19.
In prior work, I questioned the use of Grice's linguistic insights to justify particu-
lar norms of statutory interpretation-specifically, the canon authorizing courts to
avoid absurdity in the teeth of an otherwise clear text. See Manning, supra note 26, at
2463 n.274. The broader aplicability (if any) of Grice's maxims to the design of inter-
pretive rules is beyond this Essay's scope.
46 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 942.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 928.
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treatment by the government-values embodied, of course, in the
Due Process Clause. 49 All of the pro-continuity canons, he adds, will
enhance democratic accountability because "they increase the likeli-
hood that a statute will not change existing arrangements and under-
standings unless the legislature-the politically accountable body-
has faced the problem and decided that change is appropriate."
50
Finally, he emphasizes that particular continuity canons can also
protect substantive values: The requirement of narrow construction of
statutes in derogation of common law of course tends to protect pri-
vate interests in liberty and property against unconsidered legislative
change.51 And because the Court's various constitutionally inspired
"clear statement rules" raise the cost of agreement for legislation that
threatens specified constitutional values, 52 they afford indirect protec-
tion for certain hard-to-define but important principles emanating
from both the individual rights and structural portions of the
Constitution.
5 3
This is not the occasion to examine these contentions in detail.
Although it is possible of course to criticize aspects (indeed, quite im-
portant aspects) of the specific canons that Professor Shapiro ad-
mires,54 the more interesting point is that he sees value added in their
49 Id. at 943-45. As the Court has explained:
Vague laws offend several important [due process] values. First because we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportu-
nity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide ex-
plicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly dele-
gates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (citations omitted).
50 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 944.
51 Id. at 945.
52 As Colin Diver has explained, the costs of framing any legal rule "usually rise
with increases in a rule's transparency since objective regulatory line-drawing in-
creases the risk of misspecification and sharpens the focus of value conflicts." Colin S.
Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983).
53 See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 945-46.
54 Two examples will suffice. First, some have questioned whether the expressio
unius canon, in fact, accurately captures legislative directions. See, e.g., Posner, supra
note 4, at 813 (arguing that the expressio unius canon rests on a counterfactual as-
sumption of "legislative omniscience, because it would make sense only if all omis-
sions in legislative drafting were deliberate"); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 455
(observing that the omission of an item from a statutory list "may reflect inadvertence,
inability to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the decision to the courts,
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common tendency to promote continuity. Although some of the vir-
tues associated with that tendency have recently been acknowledged
in other important work, 5 praise of continuity goes very much against
the grain of modern thinking in statutory interpretation. Far more
prevalent than Professor Shapiro's theme is the insistent premise that
statutory interpretation should be "dynamic,"' 56 that it should be "nau-
tical" rather than "archaeological,"57 that American judges should act
as the legislature's partners rather than its agents, 58 and so forth. In-
deed, an important strain of the American interpretive tradition calls
upon judges to treat statutes not as a series of specific rules, but as
starting points for common law reasoning.
59
rather than an implicit negative legislative decision on the subject"). Second, some
scholars now believe that the constitutional avoidance canon and clear statement
rules disserve legislative supremacy by authorizing willful misconstructions of the un-
derlying statutes. See, e.g., JERRY L. MAsHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GovERNANCE: USING
PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 105 (1997) (arguing that willful misconstruc-
tion of a statute is more likely than outright constitutional invalidation to embed a
result that the House, Senate, and President would not have agreed upon ex ante);
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (noting that "it is
by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids'a
constitutional question is any less ajudicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on
constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute"). Full
consideration of the merits and demerits of the particular canons is for another day.
55 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 319-20,
338-40 (2000) (arguing that certain canons serve to heighten the incentives for legis-
lative caution and deliberation when important values are at stake).
56 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, Jr., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994).
57 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20,
21-22 (1988).
58 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv.
L. REV. 4, 19 (1998) ("Students of constitutional law are familiar with an alternative
conception of democracy in which courts play a vital role as partners with, rather than
mere servants of, the legislature."); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-38 (1996) (elaborating on the
partnership theory).
59 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 (1982)
(proposing "a new relationship between courts and statutes, a relationship that would
enable us to retain legislative initiative in lawmaking, characteristic of the twentieth
century, while restoring to courts their common law function of seeing to it that the
law is kept up to date"); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 313 (1986) (arguing that the
ideal judge "will use much the same techniques of interpretation to read statutes that
he uses to decide common-law cases" and "will see his own role as fundamentally the
creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best way,
the statutory scheme Congress began"); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the
United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 13, 15 (1936) (rejecting the "illusion that in inter-
preting [statutes] our only task is to discover the legislative will" and calling upon
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By liberating judges from the confines of textually expressed
rules or particular legislative expectations, such philosophies obvi-
ously amplify judicial power to read statutes in ways that facilitate legal
change rather than continuity. Underlying such positions is almost
always an implicit, if not explicit, premise that legislatures could not
deal adequately with the complexities of the modern society if they
could not call upon the judiciary for rather extensive creative assis-
tance. 60 Indeed, supporters of dynamic statutory interpretation seem
to take as a given the notion that legislatures lack the time, resources,
or political will to update statutes to deal with unforeseen and unpro-
vided-for cases. 61 Accordingly, if judges lacked adequate power to
judges to "treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent, as both a decla-
ration and a source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning").
60 As my colleague Peter Strauss has put it:
Legislation will inevitably be imprecise, requiring both interpretation and
gap-filling; pretending otherwise increases its costs. Courts are better suited
than legislatures for the classic common law function of continually in-
venting coherence out of the materials of the law. With statutes the domi-
nant form of law, and especially as they become more numerous, problems
of aging statutory judgment will inevitably arise and need to be resolved
before legislative attention can be directed to them. In the long run, finally,
successful government must be a cooperative enterprise in its everyday af-
fairs ....
Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. CT.
REV. 429, 442-43 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., CAL.BREsl, supra note 59, at 64-65
(arguing that judges should have common law authority to "sunset[ ]" obsolete stat-
utes, in part, because law reform is frequently doomed "by powerfully placed legisla-
tive minority or even just by the desire on the part of legislators to avoid a fuss");
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1530
(1987) ("Both public choice theory and institutional process theory suggest that the
legislature .. .will be [marked by] . . . failure to enact or update public interest laws,
avoidance of hard choices, and favoritism directed at power groups. These biases may
be ameliorated by treating judges as representatives charged with interpreting statutes
dynamically."); James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD
LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 219 (1934) (arguing thatjudges should revert to the more flexible
common law method of equitable interpretation, in part, because "civilization is
achieving a complexity that outstrips [the legislature's] effort to embrace its multitu-
dinous activities by rules, while the traditional attitude of the courts toward the legisla-
tive process insists upon confining that process to the making of rules").
61 For example, in support of his contention that judges in our system should act
as relational agents rather than faithful agents of the legislature, Professor Eskridge
builds upon Lieber's hypothetical command to "fetch five pounds of soupmeat." See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 327 (1989).
In particular, he analogizes the legislature to a head of household who has engaged
an agent because the principal "is a busy and important person and is often absent
from the household on business." Id. For that reason, the agent (the analogue to a
judge) must have the power to adjust "even the simplest order" to account for
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adapt statutes to such circumstances (even if beyond the statute's orig-
inally contemplated reach), then the law would ossify and fail of its
purpose. So powerful is the modern commitment to dynamism that it
is concomitantly claimed as a virtue by some important proponents of
all the traditional interpretive philosophies-textualism, 62 intentional-
ism, 63 and purposivism. 6 4
changed circumstances, unforeseen conflicts between specific directives and general
aims, and the like. See id. at 327-30.
62 As Jerry Mashaw has explained:
[T] he exclusion of legislative history is more likely to increase the flexibility
of statutes than to render them static or rigid. After all, inquiry is directed
necessarily away from pre-statutory history and toward later text including
administrative decisions, judicial decisions, and later statutes. Suppressing
the working documents, or travaux preparatoires, of codes or constitutions is a
common technique for ensuring that texts have a long, useful life. Thus
were the records of our own Constitutional Convention suppressed, as were
the working documents respecting most Western civil codes.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 836 (1991).
63 In an influential article, then-Judge Breyer relied on a somewhat different kind
of dynamism argument to support reliance on legislative history; he argued, in partic-
ular, that such reliance facilitates the enactment of new legislation. See Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845,
859 (1992). In this vein, he analyzed the insertion of an important colloquy into the
legislative history of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. See id. at 856-58. In
the relevant colloquy, Senators favorable to the bill reassured skeptical Senators that
the statute would not preempt state labor policies. Id. at 857. In defending judicial
reliance on that colloquy as evidence of legislative intent, then-Judge Breyer lamented
the anti-legislation consequences of a regime that refused to credit such legislative
history:
Suppose, in 1964, that the employers, unions, and states had thought
that committee testimony, report language, floor statements, and the like
could not influence a later judicial interpretation of the law's text. How
would the states and employers have obtained the preemption assurance
that they sought and that the unions were willing to give? They might have
tried to write a statutory provision that embodied appropriate "preemption"
language. But, one can easily imagine that time, the complexity and length
of the overall bill, and the difficulty of foreseeing future circumstances (in-
cluding how courts would interpret "anti-preemption" language) might have
made it impossible for the groups to agree on statutory language. It was
easier, however, for them to agree about floor statements or report language
about an "intent." This language is more general in form, and would not
bind courts in cases where it made no sense to do so.
It is possible, then, that if the relevant groups, institutions, and individu-
als involved in the process did not believe courts would look to legislative
history, they might not have agreed on the legislation.
Id. at 860.
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Accordingly, by counting the canons' pro-continuity bias as a vir-
tue, Professor Shapiro has made a decidedly countercultural interven-
tion in the statutory interpretation debate. By my lights, his doing so
has added a welcome perspective. Certainly, as Professor Shapiro
would be quick to acknowledge, a pro-continuity bias cannot alone
justify any given canon of construction; no one would say that the ex-
pressio unius canon or the rule of lenity should be retained simply
because it favors the status quo. Nor could a bias against continuity
alone negate the legitimacy of an otherwise legitimate canon. Neither
principle (pro- or anti-continuity) operates at a sufficiently specific
level of generality to justify any particular interpretive practice. 65
Rather, the legitimacy of any given canon, in my view, will depend on
a variety of factors-its degree of acceptance over time, 66 its accuracy
64 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moder-
ation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 728-29 (1991):
Legal process theory argued that judges should interpret statutes by choos-
ing the interpretation most consonant with the statutes' purposes. This ap-
proach is an inherently dynamic alternative to one based upon the
legislature's original intent: because society, law, and the nature of the prob-
lem change over time, effecting the statute's purpose might lead to statutory
developments not contemplated or even rejected by the statutory drafters.
Id. (footnote omitted).
65 In effect, the underlying principle is too general to do any work. To see why
this is so, consider a pro-deliberation principle. Certainly, most believe that delibera-
tion is a good thing, and the design of the U.S. Constitution seems to favor delibera-
tive democracy. But imagine if one tried to decide for or against a canon of
construction based solely on the criterion that it "promotes deliberation." Such a
criterion, at least as stated at that level of generality, has no obvious stopping point.
Thus, a pro-deliberation norm might support a canon favoring randomly selected
misinterpretations of statutes on the ground that the practice would promote further
deliberation. Cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doc-
trine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1751-52 (2002) (making a similar point about the use
of decision cost theory to design structural norms).
66 The Court presumes that Congress legislates against a backdrop of firmly estab-
lished legal conventions applied by the Court. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (noting the presumption that 'that Congress legis-
lates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction"); Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) (finding it "not only appropriate but also realistic to
presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with . . . unusually important prece-
dents" and that Congress "expect[s] its enactment[s] to be interpreted in conformity
with them"). As Justice Scalia has argued, background rules of interpretation thus
may acquire legitimacy from longstanding use:
Once they have been long indulged, [canons] acquire a sort of prescriptive
validity, since the legislature presumably has them in mind when it chooses
its language-as would be the case, for example, if the Supreme Court were
to announce and regularly act upon the proposition that "is" shall be inter-
preted to mean "is not."
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and predictability as a determinant of social meaning,67 its consistency
with the background premises of the constitutional structure,68 and
the like. Accordingly, pro- or anti-continuity biases perhaps represent
either normatively attractive or unattractive side-effects of canons
whose particular legitimacy must derive from other sources.
Nonetheless, that premise does not make the question of con-
tinuity and change irrelevant to evaluating the canons. Professor Sha-
piro's contribution has resonance for the following reason: At least
where federal statutes are concerned, it makes it more difficult to criti-
cize a canon based on its pro-continuity bias or, conversely, to urge
courts to embrace a new canon based on its propensity to facilitate
departures from the status quo. Given the premises underlying the
process of bicameralism and presentment, relying on anti-continuity
arguments simply ignores the built-in bias of a cumbersome legislative
process that emphasizes multiple checks, consensus, and deliberation.
In other words, in our system it is quite suspect to suggest that an
otherwise acceptable canon should be abandoned, in whole or in part,
because it promotes legal continuity rather than change.
II. CONTINUITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAI STRUCTURE
At the outset, I must say a few words about why I believe that the
background constitutional structure is even relevant here. As I have
emphasized in previous work, I start from the assumption that the
rules of interpretation necessarily reflect broader questions about con-
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
581, 583 (1990).
67 Compare Miller, supra note 45, at 1196-97 (arguing that the expressio unius
canon is justified by the theory of linguistic pragmatics), and Sinclair, supra note 45,
at 415-19 (same), with Posner, supra note 4, at 813 (arguing that the expressio unius
canon rests on unrealistic assumptions about legislative omniscience).
68 For example, one might argue that the canon disfavoring interpretations in
derogation of the common law is an obsolete reflection of the fact that the judicial
and legislative powers in England were less distinct than they are in the United States.
Cf John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
36-52 (2001) (discussing conflation of legislative and judicial powers and functions in
English law). As a general practice, that canon may have less legitimacy in a system of
separated powers, where the federal courts lack the independent common lawmaking
power enjoyed by their English ancestors. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials,
451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (indicating that the federal courts have common law powers
only in limited enclaves involving "the rights and obligations of the United States,
interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases") (citations omitted); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) ("[I]t remains true
that federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction
that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.").
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stitutional structure. 69 The Constitution prescribes no explicit rules
of statutory construction, v7 1 and Congress has prescribed only a few
idiosyncratic ones. 71 The judiciary, therefore, must construct most
such norms for itself. Because rules of interpretation necessarily de-
fine the relationship between the legislature and judiciary, I believe
that courts should attempt to design them to make sense rather than
nonsense of the surrounding constitutional structure.7 2 In the ab-
sence of any constitutional elaboration on the content of the "the ju-
dicial Power". "to say what the law is, ''73 one should perhaps aspire to a
theory of the law declaration function that accounts for the apparent
structural aims of a carefully designed and elaborately specified law-
making process.74 Starting from that assumption, several considera-
69 See sources cited supra note 23.
70 The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments supply specialized rules of con-
struction. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."); id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."); id. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
foreign State."). They do not speak to the problem of deciphering statutory texts.
71 See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 108 (2000) ("Whenever an Act is repealed, which repealed
a former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly
so provided."); id. § 109 ("The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release
or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless
the repealing Act shall so expressly provide . . ").
72 Cf Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988)
("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. It
must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate insti-
tutional procedures that inform interpretation."); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593-94
(1995) ("To carry out its [interpretive] task, the court must adopt-at least implic-
itly-a theory about its own role by defining the goal and methodology of the inter-
pretive enterprise and by taking an institutional stance in relation to the legislature.").
73 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
74 This analysis merely reflects the widely accepted idea that in construing open-
ended grants of constitutional power, it is appropriate and, indeed, desirable to read
the particular (but ultimately indefinite) clauses in light of the overall constitutional
structure. See CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 8-23 (1969) (examining the use of structural inference in constitutional adjudi-
cation). In particular, many aspects of the constitutional structure are open-ended,
and the document defines the three branches' respective powers in relation to one
another. Accordingly, interpretation of the rather vague terms of the Vesting Clauses
lends itself to analysis based on structure and relationship. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spend-
thrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1997) (relying on the separation of legislative
and judicial powers to infer the inviolable finality of court judgments as an attribute
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tions suggest that if one were to consider such tendencies in the
design of interpretive canons, a preference for continuity rather than
change would seem to be more consistent with the premises of our
constitutional structure.
75
Although this is not the occasion for a full consideration of the
original meaning or subsequent interpretation of the Constitution's
lawmaking provisions, it suffices to note that Article I, Section 7 re-
flects an obvious design to filter and moderate society's legislative poli-
cymaking impulses. That provision of course conditions legislation on
bicameralism and presentment. A statute must pass both Houses of
Congress and then be presented to the President for his or her ap-
proval or veto; if vetoed, it must secure the assent of two-thirds of each
of "thejudicial Power"); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) (ascrib-
ing the nondelegation doctrine to the process of bicameralism and presentment).
When used properly, such analysis unobjectionably reads an ambiguous provision in
light of related portions of the same text. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 13 n.72 (1975) ("[T]he traditional method of
'interpreting' textual provisions is hardly inconsistent with taking into account struc-
tural considerations. The former are often simply the textual embodiment of the
latter.").
75 As I have explained in greater detail in earlier writing, the goals implicit in the
design of the legislative process do not necessarily determine how judges should ap-
proach the task of interpretation. See Manning, supra note 68, at 71-74. For exam-
ple, a conclusion that the process is designed to promote continuity rather than
change does not logically compel the conclusion thatjudges should interpret the end-
product of the legislative process to provide more of the same. See id. at 73-74. In-
deed, to do so may entail double-counting the value of continuity.
Nonetheless, although perhaps not decisive, Article I, Section 7's protection of
continuity does seem relevant to evaluating interpretive norms. If the legislative pro-
cess is calculated to emphasize caution and consensus in the framing of legislation, it
is surely strange to condemn canons of interpretation because they reinforce those
very effects. By the same token, to favor new canons because they make it easier for
judges or administrators to amplify legislative changes in the status quo may allow an
end run around constitutional safeguards intended to moderate legislative change in
the first place. In other words, the values embodied in the legislative process might
amount to little if those who implement legislation do not take them into account in
the design of interpretive rules.
One additional point bears mention: In previous work, I argued that Article I,
Section 7's emphasis upon legislative compromise has a more direct effect upon inter-
pretive norms. See id. at 74-78. In particular, because the design of that process gives
political minorities the right to insist upon compromise as the price of assent, judges
and administrators undermine that protection when they adjust the lines of a clear
statutory text to make it more coherent with its perceived background purpose. See
id. at 77-78. If correct, that argument may collaterally reinforce continuity by deny-
ing the judiciary authority to adapt clear texts to unforeseen situations lying outside
the boundaries of the original compromise.
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House. 76 By dividing legislative power among three distinct institu-
tions, that cumbersome process serves several mutually reinforcing in-
terests, all of which tend to favor continuity rather than change.
First, by establishing a cumbersome legislative process involving
multiple actors the bicameralism and presentment requirements
make that process more difficult for any faction to commandeer for
purposes contrary to the public good.77 To pass legislation, three sets
of relatively independent decisionmakers-selected at different times
and by different constituencies-must agree upon a course of action.
Hence, each institution involved in the process acts as a failsafe mech-
anism against the ill motivated decisions of the other two.7 8 Madison
thus said of bicameralism:
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
77 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (noting that bicameralism ad-
dressed the "fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of public
needs"); see also RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1249 (1989) ("The Framers created two
antidotes to factionalism in Congress: bicameralism and presentment. Bicameralism
forces a potential faction to capture both Houses of Congress simultaneously. Pre-
sentment gives the president-the politically accountable entity least susceptible to
capture by factions-a voice in the legislative process."). Madison defined a faction as
"a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who
are united or actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the com-
munity." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Because the discussion that follows invokes sources such as The Federalist, I should
note that I have previously contended that interpreters should not treat such materi-
als from the ratifying debates as authoritative evidence of the Constitution's original
meaning. SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1350-54 (1998). Simply put, modern
interpreters have no basis to assume that a constitutionally sufficient number of ra-
tifiers had access to or agreed with the contents of those essays. Id. At the same time,
to the extent that it supplies a persuasive explanation of the text, structure, or history
of the Constitution, The Federalist may offer modern interpreters an informed, con-
temporaneous source of analysis. Id. at 1354-60. Borrowing from another context, I
have thus contended that modern interpreters should give The Federalist whatever
weight is warranted by "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 1360
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). To the extent that I
invoke sources such as The Federalist to support structural inferences, I do so only
insofar as they persuasively describe the purposes immanent in the constitutional de-
sign. Cf Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 875 (1930) (noting
that "the purpose of many entities may be ...something which is evident in the
character of the thing itself").
78 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 559-60 (1969). For a specific discussion of the ways in which bicameralism and
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[A] senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct
from and dividing power with the first, must be in all cases a salutary
check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by
requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usur-
pation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one, would
otherwise be sufficient.
79
Similarly, the veto not only enabled the President to defend against
legislative encroachments, but also provided "a salutary check upon
the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good which may happen to influence a majority of that
body."80
presentment operate to constrain interest group influence, see Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Mode 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 247-49 (1986). A similar cautionary impulse of course
is also evident in the more basic design of the separation of powers. To be sure, the
decision to separate the legislative, executive, and judicial powers among three rela-
tively independent branches was historically associated with many diverse purposes.
See, e.g., W.B. GwvN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127-28 (1965) (dis-
cussing the multiple purposes historically associated with the separation of powers);
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 432-38
(1987) (discussing the core purposes of the separation of powers); Paul R. Verkuil,
Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301, 303-04 (1989) (same). Still, it is difficult to deny that such separation, in part,
relied on inertia as a brake upon government excess; each branch acts as a failsafe
against bad decisionmaking by the others. As Montesquieu put it, when power is di-
vided between multiple institutions, "they will be forced to move in concert" to over-
come the natural state of "rest or inaction." CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 164 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). Simply put, if a legislature misbe-
haves, the effect of its laws may be defeated or mitigated by independent executors or
judges who may lack similar predispositions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra
note 77, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that courts would be "of vast impor-
tance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of [unjust and partial]
laws"). Hence, an important premise of our governmental structure is that liberty is
more secure if change is hard to come by without broad governmental consensus.
79 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 77, at 378-79 (James Madison); see also id.
No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (deeming it "far less probable that culpable
views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment
and in relation to the same object than that they should by turns govern and mislead
every one of them"); 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 291-92 (Robert G. McCloskey
ed., 1967) ("When a single legislature is determined to depart from the principles of
the constitution-and its incontrollable power may prompt the determination-there
is no constitutional authority to arrest its progress.... Far different will the case be,
when the legislature consists of two branches.").
80 THz FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 77, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 882, at
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Second, Article I, Section 7 also operates to constrain the influ-
ence of faction through another relevant mechanism: According to
modern political science, bicameralism and presentment effectively
require a supermajority for a statute's enactment."' This characteris-
tic diminishes any majority faction's prospects for legislative domi-
nance by giving political minorities extraordinary power to block
legislation.8 2 In so doing, bicameralism and presentment ensure that
the legislature may not alter the legal status quo unless a rather broad
segment of society (rather than a bare majority) assents to such a
change.
83
Third, bicameralism and presentment also rely on the calming
effects of deliberation. As Hamilton wrote:
348 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co, 1833) ("[T]he [veto] power... establishes a salu-
tary check upon the legislative body, calculated to preserve the community against the
effects of faction, precipitancy, unconstitutional legislation, and temporary excite-
ments, as well as political hostility.") (citation omitted).
81 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
233-48 (1962). Cass Sunstein has suggested another means by which bicameralism
and presentment might constrain factions: By dividing decisionmaking power, bicam-
eralism and presentment help counteract the polarizing tendency of group delibera-
tion. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 110-11 (2000).
82 See Manning, supra note 68, at 74-78. Indeed, by requiring equal representa-
tion of the states in the Senate, the Constitution affords specific protection to the
minority consisting of small-state residents. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also id. art. V
(providing that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate"). For an important discussion of this feature's implications for lawmak-
ing, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 1321, 1371-72 (2001).
83 This tendency is reinforced by Congress's internal rules of procedure, which
create numerous and diverse procedural hurdles to the enactment of legislation. As
Professors Shepsle and Weingast note:
The Rules Committee in the House may refuse to grant a rule for a commit-
tee bill, thereby scuttling it. The Speaker may use his power to schedule
legislation and to control debate in ways detrimental to the prospects of a
committee bill. A small group of senators in the U.S. Senate may engage in
filibuster and other forms of obstruction. Any individual senator may refuse
unanimous consent to procedures that would expedite passage of a commit-
tee bill. In short, veto groups are pervasive in legislatures ....
Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee
Power, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 85, 89 (1987); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 64 (1988) (em-
phasizing that bills must "run the gamut of the process," which involves "committees,
fighting for time on the floor, compromise because other members want some unre-
lated objective, passage, exposure to veto, and so on").
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The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater
the diversity of situations of those who are to examine it, the less
must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due
deliberation or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion
of some common passion or interest.84
Conversely, as the post-revolutionary experience with state govern-
ments had demonstrated, society potentially had much to fear from
the effects of momentary passions upon lawmaking.8 5 Hence, the
constitutional structure was designed to produce "conflicts, confusion,
and discordance" as a means to "assure full, vigorous, and open de-
bates on the great issues affecting the people."
8 6
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 77, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 1
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 79, at 294 ("In planning, forming, and ar-
ranging laws, deliberation is always becoming, and always useful."). The anticipated
calming effect of bicameralism is nicely captured in an analogy attributed to George
Washington:
There is a tradition that, on his return from France, Jefferson called Wash-
ington to account at the breakfast-table for having agreed to a second cham-
ber. "Why," asked Washington, "did you pour that coffee into your saucer?"
"To cool it," quoth Jefferson. "Even so," said Washington, "we pour legisla-
tion into the senatorial saucer to cool it."
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 359 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
85 See WooD, supra note 78, at 404-09 (discussing the perceived abuses associated
with state legislatures in the period leading up to the Philadelphia Convention); see
also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 77, at 379 (James Madison) ("The neces-
sity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous
legislatures to the impulse of sudden and violent passions .... Examples... might be
cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from
the history of other nations."); 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 195 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) ("A single assembly is
liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual; subject to fits of humor,
starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice, and consequently
productive of hasty results and absurd judgments.") (noting Adams's influential 1776
pamphlet, Thoughts on Government).
86 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 951 (1983) ("The division of the Congress into two bodies assures that the legisla-
tive power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in
separate settings."); The Pocket Veto Cases, 279 U.S. 655, 678 (1929):
[It is an] essential ... part of the constitutional provisions, guarding against
ill-considered and unwise legislation, that the President, on his part, should
have the full time allowed him for determining whether he should approve
or disapprove a bill, and if disapproved, for adequately formulating the ob-
jections that should be considered by Congress
Id. Of course, the Court has made clear that the validity of legislation does not re-
quire actual legislative discussion or debate. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 179 (1980).
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Certainly, these considerations do not bespeak an anti-continuity
bias. If anything, the opposite inference seems amply supported. By
design, the protections afforded by Article I, Section 7 raise the price
and increase the cumbersomeness of lawmaking, safeguarding liberty
through a deliberate sacrifice of governmental efficiency. At least
some important Federalists, moreover, recognized as much. They ac-
knowledged that "this complicated check on legislation may in some
instances be injurious as well as beneficial, '8 7 and that "the power of
preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good laws."' 8 How-
ever, judging from the cumbersome lawmaking structure prescribed
by Article I, Section 7, the dangers of ill advised governmental action
must have appeared more salient than the risks of inaction. Madison
thus contended that "the facility and excess of law-making," and not
the converse, "seem to be the diseases to which our governments are
most liable."89 And for Hamilton, "[t]he injury which may possibly be
done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by
preventing a number of bad ones."90 In short, the tradeoff manifest
in constitutional structure did not go unnoticed in the debate over
the Constitution; rather, it was expressly conceded, if not endorsed, by
some of the document's strongest defenders.
Let me be clear about the limited conclusion that I believe one
can draw from all of this. As I have said, I do not think it possible to
read the constitutional structure to mean that any particular canon
should be adopted or retained because it favors continuity. But given
the structural considerations just discussed, if either bias were justified
in designing interpretive norms (all else being equal), it would be one
that favored continuity rather than change. If one were an officer of
an enterprise whose watchwords were caution, consensus, and deliber-
ation, then it might seem appropriate for him or her to use imple-
mental rules of thumb that reflected the enterprise's look-before-you-
leap attitude. And it would surely be odd for such an agent to adopt
self-consciously an adventurous attitude toward the implementation of
the company's established business plan. More important, it seems
apparent that the pro-continuity canons embraced by Professor Sha-
piro should not be susceptible to criticism merely because they favor
the status quo in cases of doubt. For most of the past century, one of
legal academia's most intriguing projects has been to reform the tradi-
tional maxims of interpretation to free the judiciary's adaptive spirit
87 TiiE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 77, at 378 (James Madison).
88 Id. No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton).
89 Id. No. 62, at 378 (James Madison).
90 Id. No. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton).
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from the constraints of legal technicalities. To the extent that this
project rests on a background antipathy to interpretive practices that
favor the status quo in cases of doubt, it reflects a manner of thinking
very different from that which is embodied in the structural
constitution.
CONCLUSION
David Shapiro's Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation
makes an important contribution to legal scholarship. Its carefully
measured prose contains an often-overlooked but crucial insight:
Many of the most prominent canons of interpretation operate as a
brake on statutory change in the status quo, and this tendency is on
balance a good thing. His defense of continuity rather than change is
presented in a typically undogmatic fashion. In that spirit, it corre-
sponds with a very important and, by modern standards, counterintui-
tive point about the nature of the legislative process, at least at the
federal level. Under the U.S. Constitution, lawmaking is cumber-
some. It is that way, moreover, by design; bicameralism and present-
ment emphasize caution, consensus, and deliberation. In so doing,
the federal legislative process privileges continuity over change. Even
if that pro-continuity bias does not ultimately present a sufficient rea-
son for embracing or retaining any given canon of construction, it
surely presents a powerful answer to those who would abandon tradi-
tional rules of construction because they reflect a similar bias.
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